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Abstract 
This paper examines whether education empowers women. We 
exploit an exogenous variation in education induced by a 
longer school year in Indonesia in 1978, which fits a fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design. We find education reduces the 
number of live births, increases contraceptive use, and 
promotes reproductive health practices. However, except for a 
few outcome measures, we do not find evidence that education 
improves women’s decision making authority within 
households, asset ownership, or community participation. 
These results suggest that, to some extent, education does 
empower women in middle-income countries like Indonesia.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Women in developing countries suffer from gender inequalities. Countries like 
Yemen, Chad, and Pakistan have been ranked at the bottom of the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index. In Indonesia, for example, 96% 
of men are literate, but only 90% of women are; 86% of men participate in the 
labor market, but only 53% of women do; men earn US$ 6,903 on average, 
but women earn only US$ 2,985; only one in five legislators, senior officials, 
and managers are women; one in ten married women are 15-19 years old; 
maternal mortality rate may be as high as one in four hundred live births 
(World Economic Forum, 2013).  
Gender norms that subjugate women in the developing world are one 
of the culprits why the gender inequalities persist (Agarwal, 1994; Sullivan, 
1994). Patriarchy and traditional cultures in Asia, for example, hand more 
resources and power to men, which leads to women’s lack of access to 
education, healthcare facilities, and labor markets. Perhaps the most abhorrent 
manifestation of these gender inequalities are what Sen (1990) terms “missing 
women”, the shortfall of women relative to men that would have lived had 
they had equal access to survival-related goods. 
We can empower women, the theoretical literature points out, by 
strengthening their threat options—resources that women can control and 
opportunities outside their households they can exploit (Lundberg and Pollak, 
1993; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Manser and Brown, 1980). The empirical 
literature also supports this claim: These papers find access to resources such 
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as microfinance, earned income, and land rights does empower women (Pitt 
and Khandker, 1998; Hashemi et al., 1996; Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; 
Panda and Agarwal, 2005).  
In this paper, we focus on the effects of education on women’s 
empowerment. Education may increase women’s bargaining power within 
their households because it endows them knowledge, skills, and resources to 
make life choices that improve their welfare (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; 
Duflo, 2012). Empirical work also show education empowers women: It 
reduces fertility, increases contraceptives use, and reduces women’s tolerance 
of gender discrimination (Breierova and Duflo, 2004; Osili and Long, 2008; 
Leon, 2004; Mocan and Cannonier, 2012).  
Estimation of the effects of education on empowerment, however, is 
difficult because women’s preferences, family background,  and community 
characteristics that affect both education and empowerment may be 
unobserved (Duflo, 2012). If these unobserved characteristics correlate with 
education and women’s empowerment, ordinary least square estimates of the 
effects of education will be biased. One way to solve this problem is to exploit 
sources of variations in education that are unrelated to women’s characteristics 
and empowerment.   
In this paper, we exploit an exogenous variation in schooling induced 
by a longer school year in Indonesia in 1978. Individuals who were born in 
1971 or earlier experienced the longer school year in 1978 if they did not drop 
out of schools earlier; individuals who were born later did not. There is, 
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therefore, a discontinuity in the probability of experiencing the longer school 
year between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts, which fits a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity (RD) design. Parinduri (2013) shows, using this fuzzy RD 
design, the longer school year increases years of schooling; in this paper, we 
focus on women and examine whether the exogenous increase in women’s 
education affects their empowerment. 
We find education reduces the number of live births, increases 
contraceptive use, and promotes reproductive health practices. However, 
except for a few outcome measures, we do not find evidence that education 
improves women’s decision making authority, asset ownership, or community 
participation.  
We contribute to the literature in three respects. One, we provide the 
causal effects of education on women’s empowerment using a natural 
experiment that fits an RD design, which complements papers in the literature 
that use instrumental variable techniques.1 Two, we analyze Indonesia, a 
middle-income country, which complements papers on women’s 
empowerment in poor countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Nigeria, and Sierra 
Leone.2 Three, we examine the effects of education on various measures of 
                                                          
1
 These papers use, among others, school construction programmes, compulsory 
schooling policies, and school entry policies as instruments; see Breierova and Duflo 
(2004), Osili and Long (2008), Leon (2004), and Mocan and Cannonier (2012). 
2
 Panda and Agarwal (2005) analyze women’s empowerment in a middle-income 
country, India; but Indonesia has a different cultural and social environment. We are 
not aware of papers that examine the effects of education on women’s empowerment 
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empowerment such as fertility, contraceptive use, reproductive health 
practices, decision making authority, asset ownership, and community 
participation. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the longer school year. Section 
3 presents the empirical strategy and the data. Section 4 discusses the results 
and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE LONGER SCHOOL YEAR 
The government of Indonesia implemented a longer school year in 1978 to 
change the start of the academic year. The academic year had run from 
January to December, but in 1978, to synchronize the academic year with the 
government budget year, the Indonesian Minister of Education and Culture, 
Daoed Yusuf, changed the start of the school year from January to July. To 
achieve this objective, he required schools to lengthen the 1978 academic year 
until June 1979. Therefore, children who attended schools in the 1978 
academic year completed their grades not in December 1978, but in June 
1979: They remained in the same grades for an extended period of six months.  
Community leaders and some lawmakers opposed the change; they 
argued the government should not change education policies haphazardly as 
Daoed Yusuf and his predecessors had done. (He announced the change in 
                                                                                                                                                        
in Indonesia except Gallaway and Bernasek (2004) who analyze correlations between 
literacy on women’s labor force participation.  
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June 1978, in the middle of the 1978 academic year.) Parents associations 
opposed it too because, among others, they worried children had become the 
guinea pigs of every education ministers’ desire to change education policies. 
Parents also protested the additional costs they had to incur because Daoed 
Yusuf reduced tuition fees by only 50% during the extended term, and it 
applied to students in public schools only (Tempo, 1978). 
Despite the opposition, Daoed Yusuf went ahead and changed the start 
of the school year  by requiring students who attended schools in 1978 to 
remain in the same grades until June 1979. He did not provide new teaching 
materials; he did not change the curriculum either. Rather, he asked teachers to 
revise materials that they had covered in 1978 (Tempo, 1978; MPKRI, 1978), 
which, in effect, makes the six-month extension in 1979 resembles a one-time 
longer school year. 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA 
(a) Empirical Strategy 
We exploit an exogenous variation in years of schooling induced by a longer 
school year in Indonesia in 1978, which fits a regression discontinuity (RD) 
design, to identify the effects of education on women’s empowerment.3 
                                                          
3
 Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) introduce this empirical strategy. See also Lee 
and Lemieux (2010), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and Hahn et al. (2001). See 
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Because whether a woman experienced the longer school year is not a 
deterministic function of her year of birth, we have a fuzzy RD design. 
Women who were born in 1972 or later did not experience the longer school 
year because they had not entered primary schools in 1978 when the 
government implemented the longer school year; women who were born in 
1971 or earlier experienced the longer school year, but only if they did not 
drop out of school before 1978. Therefore, conditional on the year of birth, 
there is a discontinuity in the probability of experiencing the longer school 
year between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts, which we use as an instrumental 
variable for the treatment status, the longer school year, in a fuzzy RD design. 
We implement the fuzzy RD design as a system of three equations as 
follows. Let   denote the treatment status, the longer school year, which 
indicates whether woman i experienced the longer school year. Using an 
indicator, older cohorts, Ti, that equals one for the 1971 and older cohorts and 
zero otherwise as an instrumental variable for , we can write the first-stage 
equation as    
  = 	 +  + 	
 +  (1) 
where 	
 is a polynomial function of yobi, the year of birth of woman i. 
The second-stage equation-by-equation two-stage least square (2SLS) 
estimation of the effects of the longer school year on education is 
  = 	 +  + 	
 +  (2) 
                                                                                                                                                        
McCrary and Royer (2011) for a paper on the effects of female education on fertility 
using RD designs. 
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where  is a measure of educational outcomes of woman i, and   is the 
predicted value woman i’s treatment status from Equation (1).  The third-stage 
of the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimation of the effects of education on 
women’s empowerment is then 
  =  +   + 	
 +  (3) 
where  is a measure of empowerment of woman i, and    is the predicted 
value of her educational outcome from Equation (2).  
 If education improves women’s empowerment, we expect the 
coefficient of   in Equation (3) to be negative for number of live births and 
positive for contraceptive use, reproductive health practices, decision making 
authority, ownership of assets, and community participation. 
 
(b) Data 
We use the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), a longitudinal survey of a 
representative sample of the Indonesian population initiated by the RAND 
Corporation.4 To have the largest sample of women who completed high 
school, we use the latest wave of the survey, IFLS-4, done in 2007. To ensure 
the older cohort (those born in 1971 or earlier) had some likelihood of 
experiencing the longer school year in 1978 and the younger cohort (those 
born in 1972 or later) had completed high schools when they were interviewed 
                                                          
4
 See Strauss et al. (2009b) for a description of the survey. 
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in 2007, we  include women born in the period of 1960-1987, which gives us a 
sample size of 22,197 women.5 
We define the older cohort, Ti, equals one if woman i was born in 1971 
or earlier and zero otherwise. The sample consists of about 6,500 women 
whose Ti equals one and 15,500 women whose Ti equals zero.  
We construct the longer school year, Di, using the information on the 
year of birth of woman i, her educational attainment, and the number of times 
she repeated grades. In the basic specifications, Di equals one if woman i was 
in primary, junior high, or senior high school in the 1978 academic year and 
zero otherwise. If a woman was born in 1971 or earlier and she did not drop 
out of school before 1978, she experienced the longer school year; but if she 
was born in 1972 or later, she did not experience the longer school year.6 
Therefore, women in the 1971 or older cohort have Di equals one if they were 
still in school in 1978; women in the 1972 or younger cohort have Di equals 
                                                          
5
 Only ever married women were asked questions on women’s fertility and 
contraceptive use; therefore, the sample size ranges from about 3,300-10,700 women 
in some specifications, which depends on the measure of outcome of we use. Only 
currently married women were asked questions on women’s decision making 
authority; therefore, the sample size for decision making authority ranges from about 
4,300-9,300 depending on the measure of outcome. 
6
 Most children in Indonesia enter primary schools in the year they are seven years 
old; in our basic specifications, we assume that women born in 1972 or later entered 
primary school in 1979 or later and, therefore, did not experience the longer school 
year. 
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zero.  About 53% of women in the 1960-1971 cohorts experienced the longer 
school year while none of the women in the 1972-1987 cohorts did.  
We use the year of birth to define the longer school year because, in 
developing countries like Indonesia, some people do not know their date of 
birth, let alone the year in which they entered primary school. In the IFLS, 
some people give different birthdates in different books within the same wave 
so that RAND has to make “best guesses” of these birthdates using an 
algorithm to make them as consistent as possible (Strauss et al., 2009a). 
However, we also use the year of entry into primary school to define the 
longer school year in some specifications as part of robustness checks.  
We use two measures of educational outcomes: (1) the years of 
schooling, and (2) completion of senior high school, an indicator equals one if 
a woman completed senior high school and zero otherwise.  
We use four groups of measures of women’s empowerment: (1) 
women’s fertility and reproductive health behavior, (2) decision making 
authority, (3) asset ownership, and (4) community participation. Women’s 
fertility and reproductive health behavior include the number of live births, 
ideal number of children, and a set of indicators on whether a woman uses 
contraception, breastfed youngest child, took iron pills during pregnancy, or 
received tetanus injections before  pregnancy.7 Women’s decision making 
                                                          
7
 The number of live births is the number of children a woman has given birth to in 
her lifetime, some of whom may have passed away; the ideal number of children is 
the number of children a woman would have if she could choose. Currently using 
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authority includes a set of indicators equal one if a woman has some say on a 
particular household decision (i.e., either she is the sole decision maker or 
joint decision maker with her spouse) and zero otherwise. Outcome measures 
for asset ownership include a set of indicators equal one if a woman has some 
ownership (i.e., either she is the sole owner or joint owner along with her 
spouse) of a particular asset and zero otherwise. Women’s community 
participation equals one if a woman participated in a community or 
government activity in the past twelve months and zero otherwise.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The averages in Panel A do 
not show the expected effects of the longer school year on education. 
Compared to the 1971 or older cohort, women born in 1972 or later (those 
who did not experience the longer school year) have on average 1.5 additional 
years of education. They are also more likely to complete senior high school 
than the older cohort.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
The averages do not show the expected effects of the longer school 
year on fertility and reproductive health behavior either. Women in the older 
cohort have more live births and desire more children (panel B); fewer women 
in the older cohort use contraception (panel C);  more women in the older 
                                                                                                                                                        
contraceptives is an indicator equals one if a woman at the time of the survey was 
using a form of contraception to prevent or postpone a pregnancy and zero otherwise. 
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cohort breastfeed, but fewer consume iron pills and receive tetanus injections 
prior to marriage (panel D).   
We do not see strong evidence of the expected effects of education on 
decision making authority, asset ownership, or community participation. Panel 
E shows the older and the younger cohorts have no differences in women’s 
decision making authority; the averages for all types of decisions are similar 
except for employment decisions, in which case the older cohort is more likely 
to have some say on the employment choices of the respondent or spouse. 
Panel F shows the older and the younger cohorts’ asset ownership do not 
differ much except for poultry, livestock, vehicle, and household appliances. 
Panel G, however, shows women in the older cohort are more likely to 
participate in most types of community programs.  
 
 
4. RESULTS 
(a) First-stage, reduced-form and 2SLS regressions 
We now discuss the first-stage regressions of the longer school year on older 
cohorts, the reduced-form estimates of the effects of the longer school year on 
education, and the corresponding 2SLS estimates of the effects of the longer 
school year on education. 
Figure 1 illustrates the first-stage regressions of the longer school year 
on the year of birth. The graphs plot the proportion of women who 
experienced the longer school year in the 1978-1979 academic year by the 
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year of birth. We define the longer school year using the year of birth in panel 
A and using the year of entry to primary schools in panel B. Both graphs fit a 
cubic polynomial of the year of birth that may jump between the 1971 and 
1972 cohorts.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
To the left of the vertical dash-line in panel A, the proportion of 
women who experienced the longer school year increases: About one in five 
women in the 1960 cohort to about four in five in the 1971 cohort. To the right 
of the vertical dash line, none of the 1972 or younger cohorts experienced the 
longer school year by definition. Panel B shows a similar picture: The 
proportion of women who experienced the longer school year, which we 
define using the year of entry into primary schools, drops from about 0.7-0.8 
for the older cohort near the discontinuity to about 0.2 for the younger cohort. 
We use this discontinuity in the probability of treatment between the 1971 and 
1972 cohorts as an instrumental variable for the longer school year.  
Figure 2 illustrates the reduced-form estimates of the longer school 
year, defined using the year of birth, on educational outcomes. Panel A plots 
the average number of years of education by the year of birth and fits a cubic 
polynomial of the year of birth that may jump between the 1971 and 1972 
cohorts. The figure shows educational attainment increases from about seven 
years in 1960 to ten years in the late 1980s, but the average educational 
attainment falls by about one year between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts. Panel 
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B shows a similar picture for the proportion of women who completed high 
school (i.e., twelve years of education). The trend line increases overtime but 
it drops between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts. The fall indicates that the longer 
school year increases the likelihood of a woman completing senior high school 
by about ten percentage points.  
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
Table 2 presents the estimates from the first-stage (Panel A), reduced-
form (Panel B), and second-stage regressions (Panel C). Each column uses a 
different specification: Column 1 includes year of birth cubic polynomial as 
controls; column 2 adds age cubic polynomial; and column 3 adds a set of 
religion indicators. (Because the data fit an RD design, we do not expect 
additional control variables would affect the results.) In row 1, we define the 
longer school year using the year of birth; in row 2, using the year of entry 
into primary school. In Panels B and C, we define the longer school year using 
the year of birth, which corresponds with the first-stage regressions in row 1.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
In column 1 of row 1, the older cohorts are a hundred percentage points 
more likely to experience the longer school year, which confirms the 
discontinuity we see in Figure 1. (We present bootstrap standard errors with 
one hundred replications in parentheses.) We find similar estimates when we 
include age or religion indicators as additional controls in columns 2 and 3. In 
row 2, using the year of entry into primary schools to define the longer school 
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year, the estimates are 77 percentage points. Again, these estimates confirm 
the discontinuity in Figure 1. All estimates in Panel A are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
Panel B reports the reduced-form estimates of the effects of the longer 
school year, which we define using the year of birth, on educational attainment 
and completion of senior high school. The estimates for educational 
attainment and completing senior high school are 0.7 years and 13 percentage 
points respectively, which correspond with the jumps we see in Figure 2.  
Panel C presents the corresponding 2SLS estimates of the effects of the 
longer school year on educational outcomes. The longer school year increases 
educational attainment by about 0.7 years, a large increase given the average 
years of schooling at the time is nine. The longer school year also increases 
the likelihood of completing senior high school by thirteen percentage points, 
a 30% increase given that 42% of women completed high schools. Because we 
use an RD design as the empirical strategy, as we expect, the estimates are 
similar across the different specifications in columns 1-3 regardless of whether 
we include additional control variables.  
 
(b) Fertility and reproductive health 
Figure 3 illustrates some of the reduced-form estimates of the effects of the 
longer school year on fertility and reproductive health practices. The trend 
lines in the graphs seem to jump between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts, though 
the jumps are less obvious in some. The number of live births, for example, 
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declines over time, but its trend line rises between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts. 
The proportion of women who use contraception increases in the 1960s but its 
trend line falls between 1971 and 1972. The same applies to the proportion of 
women who breastfeed their children and that of women who receive tetanus 
injections, though the fall in the former is unclear. 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
The reduced-form and the 2SLS estimates in columns 1-2 of Table 3 
confirm these effects: The longer school year decreases the number of live 
births by 0.3 and increases the likelihood that women use contraception, 
breastfeed their children, and receive tetanus injections by six (10%), two 
(3%), and nine (14%) percentage points respectively. There is no evidence that 
the longer school year decreases ideal number of children that the women 
want or increases the probability that they take iron pills: The estimate of the 
former is positive, but its standard error is as large as the estimate; the estimate 
of the latter is positive but insignificant statistically.  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
Column 3 shows the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates of the 
effects of one more year of schooling: An additional year of education reduces 
the number of live births by 0.4 and increases the likelihood of using 
contraception, breastfeeding, and receiving tetanus injections by six (10%), 
three (3%), and eight (12%) percentage points, respectively. Though 
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educational attainment appears to increase intake of iron pills by two 
percentage points, the estimate is insignificant statistically.  
Column 4, which presents the corresponding estimates of the effect of 
completing senior high school, shows the results are consistent with those in 
columns 2 and 3. Completing senior high school reduces number of live births 
by 1.9 children on average and increases the use of contraception, breast 
feeding, and receiving tetanus injections by 37 (60%), 16 (16%), and 37 (57%) 
percentage points respectively. The estimate for iron pills is positive but 
insignificant statistically. 
 
(c) Household decision making authority 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the effects of education on women’s 
household decision making authority. Each panel represents a different 
category of decisions: Panel A is about decisions on household expenditure, 
Panel B children’s welfare, Panel C household savings, and Panels D and E 
whether a respondent or spouse should work or use of contraceptives, 
respectively.  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
The reduced-form and 2SLS estimates in columns 1 and 2 show the 
longer school year increases the likelihood that women have some say on 
routine purchases, children’s education and health, monthly savings, 
employment, and contraceptive use. However, only the estimate for monthly 
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savings is significant statistically (four percentage points or 5%). (Figure 4 
illustrates some of the reduced-form estimates.) The estimates for food eaten 
at home, children’s clothing, and money for arisan—a form of rotating savings 
and credit association—are negative, but only that of money for arisan is 
significant statistically; the longer school year reduces the likelihood that 
women have a say on arisan by four percentage points (4%).8 
<Insert Figure 4 here> 
The equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates in columns 3 and 4 show no 
evidence that education improves women’s decision making authority on 
expenditure, children’s outcomes, employment, and contraceptive use; it 
affects decision making on household savings, however. An extra year of 
education increases the likelihood of having a say on monthly savings by five 
percentage points (6%); completion of senior high school increases the 
likelihood by 22 percentage points (26%). Furthermore, educational 
attainment reduces decision making authority on arisan money by seven 
percentage points (7%); completing twelve years of education reduces it by 26 
percentage points (28%). The other estimates are insignificant statistically; the 
standard errors are as large as the estimates.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Arisan is one of the oldest and most widespread form of rural financial institutions 
in Indonesia (Hospes, 1996).  
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(d) Asset ownership 
Table 5, which presents the effects of education on asset ownership, 
shows the longer school year does not seem to affect ownership of land, 
poultry, livestock, vehicles, savings, and receivables. (The estimates are 
insignificant statistically; the estimate for vehicles is significant only at the 
10% level.) There is, however, some evidence that education affects 
ownership of household appliances and jewelry: The reduced-form and 2SLS 
estimates in columns 1 and 2 indicate that the longer school year increases the 
likelihood of owning household appliances by about three percentage points 
(3%) and decreases the likelihood of owning jewelry by about two percentage 
points (2%). The estimates of the effect of education in columns 3 and 4 show 
an extra year of education and completing senior high school increases the 
likelihood of owning household appliances by five (5%) and 20 (22%) 
percentage points, respectively, and reduces the likelihood of owning jewelry 
by two (2%) and nine (9%) percentage points, respectively. All other estimates 
are insignificant statistically. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
 
(e) Community participation 
Table 6, which presents the effects of education on community participation, 
shows no evidence that education improves community participation for 
monthly arisan meetings, community meetings, participating in village 
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cooperatives, programs to improve the village, voluntary labor, village loans 
and savings programs, health fund, and women’s association activities; all 
estimates are insignificant statistically at conventional level of significance. 
The longer school year, however increases the likelihood of a woman 
participating in Posyandu or the community weighing posts—community 
centers that the government of Indonesia sets up to provide pre- and postnatal 
healthcare for women and infants—by about six percentage points (16 
percent).  
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
(f) Robustness checks 
We do a number of robustness checks: (1) we include alternative 
polynomial functions of the assignment variable and additional control 
variables, (2) we use alternative assignment variables and definitions of the 
longer school year, and (3) we do some falsification tests.  
Table 7 presents the effects of education on key outcome measures 
using additional controls and alternative polynomial functions of the 
assignment variable. Columns 1 and 5 include year of birth quadratic 
polynomial; columns 2 and 6 year of birth quartic polynomial; columns 3 and 
7 age cubic polynomial; and columns 4 and 8 both age cubic polynomial and 
religion indicators. Overall the results are robust; both the signs and magnitude 
of the estimates are similar to those in the basic results. 
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<Insert Table 7 here> 
Table 8 presents the effects of education using alternative assignment 
variables and different definitions of the longer school year. Columns 1 and 3 
use the year of birth as the assignment variable and define the longer school 
year using the year of entry into primary schools; columns 2 and 4 use the year 
of entry as the assignment variable and define the longer school year using the 
year of entry. Overall, the results are robust except for a few cases in which 
we use the year of entry into primary schools as the assignment variable. Some 
of the estimates in columns 2  and 4 are insignificant statistically, which may 
be caused by measurement errors in the year of entry to primary schools we 
describe in the data section. Nevertheless, the signs and the magnitude of the 
estimates are similar to those in the basic results.  
<Insert Table 8 here> 
Table 9 presents some falsification tests to see whether there are other 
discontinuities between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts. We consider the age of 
women, whether they were born in rural areas, whether they lived in rural 
areas when they were twelve years old, whether their biological parents were 
married when they were twelve years old, and whether their biological parents 
are currently living in the same household. In column 1, we define the longer 
school year using the year of birth; in column 2 using the year of entry to 
primary schools.  
<Insert Table 9 here> 
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All estimates are insignificant statistically at conventional level of 
significance; we do not find evidence that there are discontinuities in these 
variables between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts that may compromise 
identification using the RD design. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Education reduces women’s fertility, increases contraceptive use, and 
promotes reproductive health practices. An additional year of schooling 
reduces women’s number of live births by 0.4 on average; it increases 
women’s likelihood of using contraception, breastfeeding children, and 
receiving tetanus injections by 10, 3, and 12%, respectively. Completing 
senior high school reduces the number of live births by two children and 
increases the likelihood of using contraception, breastfeeding children, and 
receiving tetanus injections by 60, 17, and 57%, respectively. 
There is no evidence that education improves women’s decision 
making authority (except on savings), women’s assets ownership (except that 
of household appliances and jewelry), or community participation (except 
visiting the community weighing post), at least along the measures that we 
examine in this paper. In any case, most women in Indonesia have some say 
on expenditure and children’s decisions and almost all own houses or jewelry 
(see Panel F of Table 1), which perhaps drives the insignificant results. Most 
women do not participate in community activities, in particular women in the 
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younger cohorts who are more educated on average (see Panel G of Table 1). 
Therefore, it may be difficult to identify the effects of education on women’s 
decision making authority, asset ownership, or community participation in 
Indonesia  using the measures that we have in the IFLS even if education 
matters. Among the significant results, one more year of schooling increases 
the likelihood that women have a say on monthly savings by 6% and reduces 
the likelihood that they have decision making authority on arisan money by 
7%. Education also increases ownership of household appliances by 5% and 
reduces ownership of jewelry by 2%. Education gives women some say on 
savings, including on moving away from arisan as means of saving. There is 
no evidence that education increases women’s ownership of savings, however. 
These findings are in line with the bargaining theory of Lundberg and 
Pollak (1993), Manser and Brown (1980), and McElroy and Horney (1981). 
Education is a threat option that increases women’s bargaining power within 
households; it endows women with knowledge, power, and resources to make 
life choices that improve their welfare. More educated women have fewer 
children, use contraception, have better reproductive health practices, and have 
some say on household decision making—education empowers women to 
choose the best for themselves and to bargain with their husbands on how to 
allocate resources within their households.  
Our results are in line with the empirical literature on the effects of 
education on women’s empowerment; they also sit within the broader 
empirical literature on how women’s threat options empower women. Mocan 
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and Cannonier (2012), for example, find education improves Sierra Leonean 
women’s attitudes towards women’s health and domestic violence, reduces 
their number of desired children, and increases their likelihood of using 
contraceptives and getting tested for AIDS; Breierova and Duflo (2004) and 
Osili and Long (2008) also find education reduces women’s fertility in 
Indonesia and Nigeria, respectively. On women’s threat option literature, 
Panda and Agarwal (2005) find ownership of land reduces risk of marital 
violence in India; Hashemi et al. (1996) find access to microfinance increases 
women’s mobility, decision making authority, ownership of productive assets, 
and awareness and participation in public campaigns and protests in 
Bangladesh.  
Our findings imply publicly funded education (the use of taxpayers’ 
money and government resources to finance public schools) in middle-income 
countries like Indonesia has higher rates of returns than previous estimates in 
the literature because education not only produces skilled workers and 
informed voters, but also empowers women. Public education may increase 
contraceptive use (which will limit unwanted pregnancies), reduce fertility 
rates (with better family planning), and promote women’s health practices.  As 
women become more educated, their children may also do better because the 
women, among others, have their children breastfed and immunized, which 
reduces child malnutrition and mortality rates.9 Moreover, women will have 
                                                          
9
 Indonesia, for example, 28% of children below the age of five are underweight; 45% 
of them are malnourished (WHO, 2012). 
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more say on how to allocate resources within their households, which may 
funnel more resources to children’s health and education.10  
In this paper, we do not explore the mechanisms through which 
education empower women; we do not examine whether education affects 
other aspects of women’s welfare such as domestic violence or freedom of 
movement. These questions could be perhaps explored in future research. 
  
                                                          
10
 Thomas (1994), for example, finds finances controlled by women improve 
children’s health. 
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A. Using the year of birth to define the longer school year 
 
B. Using year of the entry into primary schools to define the longer school year 
Figure 1: The first-stage regressions 
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A. Educational attainment 
 
B. Completed twelve years of education 
Figure 2: The effects on education 
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A. The number of live births 
 
B. The proportion of women using contraception 
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C. The proportion of women that breastfeed 
 
D. The proportion of women that received tetanus injections 
Figure 3: The effects on fertility and reproductive health behavior 
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A. The proportion of women who has a say on children’s health decisions 
 
B. The proportion of women who has a say on monthly savings 
Figure 4: The effects on decision making authority 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable 1960-1971 
cohort 
1972-1987 
cohort 
1960-1987 
cohort 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
A: Educational outcomes 
 
   
Educational attainment 8.017 
(3.728) 
9.514 
(2.860) 
 
9.068 
(3.217) 
Completed senior high school 0.341 
(0.474) 
0.459 
(0.498) 
0.422 
(0.494) 
    
B: Fertility outcomes  
 
   
Number of live births 2.865 
(2.455) 
1.546 
(1.041) 
 
1.849 
(1.590) 
Ideal number of children 3.039 
(1.695) 
2.560 
(1.103) 
2.713 
(1.341) 
 
C: Contraceptive use  
 
   
Currently using contraception 
 
0.579 
(0.493) 
0.611 
(0.487) 
 
0.601 
(0.489) 
D: Health practices 
 
   
Breastfed child 0.970 
(0.170) 
0.964 
(0.185) 
 
0.967 
(0.178) 
Took iron pills 0.073 
(0.259) 
0.126 
(0.331) 
 
0.108 
(0.310) 
Received tetanus injection  0.558 
(0.496) 
0.653 
(0.476) 
0.623 
(0.484) 
    
E: Household decision making authority 
 
   
Expenditure    
On food eaten at home 0.915 
(0.277) 
0.921 
(0.268) 
 
0.919 
(0.271) 
On routine purchases 0.938 
(0.240) 
0.935 
(0.246) 
 
0.936 
(0.243) 
On large expensive purchases 0.902 
(0.269) 
0.902 
(0.296) 
0.902 
(0.296) 
Children    
On clothes 0.955 
(0.205) 
0.962 
(0.188) 
 
0.960 
(0.194) 
On education 0.955 
(0.206) 
0.965 
(0.182) 
 
0.962 
(0.190) 
On health 0.971 
(0.167) 
0.972 
(0.164) 
0.971 
(0.165) 
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Table 1: Summary statistics (continued) 
 1960-1971 
cohort 
1972-1987 
cohort 
1960-1987  
cohort 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Savings 
   
On monthly savings 0.857 
(0.349) 
0.856 
(0.350) 
 
0.856 
(0.350) 
On money for arisan 0.919 
(0.272) 
0.932 
(0.250) 
 
0.928 
(0.258) 
Others    
On employment of respondent or spouse 0.840 
(0.366) 
0.770 
(0.420) 
 
0.793 
(0.404) 
On contraceptive use by respondent or spouse 0.969 
(0.170) 
0.971 
(0.168) 
0.970 
(0.169) 
    
F: Asset ownership 
 
   
House (including land) 0.981 
(0.134) 
0.966 
(0.180) 
 
0.974 
(0.159) 
Poultry 0.838 
(0.368) 
0.792 
(0.405) 
 
0.813 
(0.389) 
Livestock  0.771 
(0.420) 
0.831 
(0.374) 
 
0.806 
(0.395) 
Vehicle 0.787 
(0.409) 
0.713 
(0.452) 
 
0.738 
(0.439) 
Household appliances 0.966 
(0.180) 
0.922 
(0.267) 
 
0.938 
(0.241) 
Savings 0.857 
(0.349) 
0.856 
(0.350) 
 
0.857 
(0.350) 
Receivables 0.878 
(0.327) 
0.856 
(0.350) 
 
0.864 
(0.341) 
Jewelry 0.959 
(0.196) 
 
0.979 
(0.142) 
0.973 
(0.160) 
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Table 1: Summary statistics (continued) 
   1960-1971 
cohort 
1972-1987 
cohort 
1960-1987 
cohort 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
G: Community Participation  
 
   
Arisan 
 
0.452 
(0.497) 
0.362 
(0.480) 
0.389 
(0.487) 
 
Community meeting 
 
0.272 
(0.445) 
0.146 
(0.353) 
0.186 
(0.389) 
 
Village cooperative 
 
0.163 
(0.369) 
0.089 
(0.285) 
0.113 
(0.317) 
 
Programme to improve the village 
 
0.211 
(0.408) 
0.155 
(0.362) 
0.172 
(0.378) 
 
Voluntary labor 
 
0.271 
(0.445) 
0.218 
(0.413) 
0.235 
(0.424) 
 
Village savings and loans 
 
0.163 
(0.369) 
0.095 
(0.293) 
0.117 
(0.321) 
 
Health fund 
 
0.658 
(0.474) 
0.493 
(0.500) 
0.548 
(0.497) 
 
Women’s association activities 
 
0.285 
(0.451) 
0.146 
(0.353) 
0.190 
(0.392) 
 
Community weighing post 0.209 
(0.406) 
0.373 
(0.483) 
0.324 
(0.468) 
Notes: The number in each cell is the mean; the standard deviations are in parentheses. The number of women 
who did not experience the longer school year in column 1 are 2000-8000 (Panel B), 7000-8000 (Panel C), 3400-
7200 (Panel D), 300-3900 (Panel E), 2300-9300 (Panel F); and 2000-8000 (Panel G). The number of women 
who experienced the school year in column 2 are 1700-4700 (Panel B), 3900-4400 (Panel C), 1800-3700 (Panel 
D), 300-2300 (Panel E), 1200-4600 (Panel F), and 1200-4100 (Panel G). 
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Table 2: First-stage, reduced-form, and second-stage regressions 
     
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
A: First-stage regressions 
 
    
Using the year of birth to define the longer school year     
Older cohorts (1) 1.049*** 
(0.008) 
 
1.049*** 
(0.008) 
1.050*** 
(0.009) 
Adjusted R2  0.737 0.738 0.738 
Number of observations  17427 
 
17427 13247 
Using the year of entry to define the longer school year     
Older cohorts (2) 0.777*** 
(0.009) 
 
0.777*** 
(0.009) 
0.767*** 
(0.011) 
Adjusted R2  0.579 0.579 0.560 
Number of observations  17326 17326 13150 
     
B: Reduced-form  
 
    
Educational attainment     
Older cohorts (3) 0.703*** 
(0.121) 
0.702*** 
(0.121) 
0.682** 
(0.138) 
Completed senior high school     
Older cohorts (4) 0.136*** 
(0.018) 
0.136*** 
(0.018) 
0.135*** 
(0.020) 
     
C: 2SLS 
 
    
Educational attainment     
Longer school year (5) 0.670*** 
(0.115) 
0.670*** 
(0.113) 
0.650** 
(0.128) 
Completed senior high school     
Longer school year (6) 0.134*** 
(0.018) 
0.134*** 
(0.018) 
0.132*** 
(0.019) 
     
Controls 
 
    
Year of birth cubic polynomial 
 
 
   
Age cubic polynomial     
 
Religion indicators 
 
    
 
Notes: In Panel A, the number in each cell is the estimate of older cohorts from a regression of longer school 
year on older cohorts and a set of control variables. In row 1, the longer school year equals one if a woman was 
born in 1971 or earlier and was still in school in 1978, zero otherwise; in row 2, the longer school year equals 
one if a woman entered primary school in 1978 or earlier and was in school in 1978. In Panel B, the number in 
each cell is the reduced-form estimate of the longer school year defined using the year of birth. Panel C reports 
the corresponding 2SLS estimates. The numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors with 100 
replications. The asteriks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3: The effects on fertility and reproductive health behavior 
  The effects of 
 Reduced-form 
 
(1) 
Longer school 
year 
(2) 
Educational 
attainment 
(3) 
Completing high 
school 
(4) 
 
A: Number of children 
 
    
Number of live births -0.264*** 
(0.067) 
 
-0.318*** 
(0.0713) 
-0.406** 
(0.105) 
-1.977*** 
(0.429) 
Ideal number of children 0.056 
(0.057) 
0.066 
(0.060) 
-0.036 
(0.076) 
-0.094 
(0.371) 
B: Contraceptive Use 
 
    
Currently using 
contraception 
 
0.055*** 
(0.018) 
0.063*** 
(0.021) 
0.058** 
(0.036) 
0.372** 
(0.165) 
C: Health practices 
 
    
Breastfeed child 0.033** 
(0.010) 
0.018* 
(0.012) 
0.034** 
(0.015) 
 
0.160** 
(0.070) 
Took iron pills 0.014 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
0.019 
(0.016) 
 
0.108 
(0.083) 
Received tetanus injection 0.085** 
(0.017) 
 
0.098*** 
(0.021) 
0.078** 
(0.035) 
0.372** 
(0.146) 
Notes: The number in each cell in column 1 is the estimate of older cohorts in a regression of fertility or 
reproductive health behavior on older cohorts and year of birth cubic polynomial. Each cell in column 2 is the 
corresponding 2SLS estimate. Columns 3 and 4 present the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates of the effects 
of educational attainment or completion of senior high school on fertility and reproductive health behavior, 
respectively. Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The asteriks ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4: The effects on decision making authority 
  The effects of 
 Reduced-form 
 
(1) 
Longer school 
year 
(2) 
 Educational 
attainment 
(3) 
Completing high 
school 
(4) 
 
A: Expenditure 
 
    
 Food eaten at home 
 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.016) 
 
-0.088 
(0.080) 
Routine purchases 
 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
 
0.047 
(0.073) 
Large expensive purchases 
 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.022 
(0.087) 
 
B: Children 
 
    
Clothes 
 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
 
-0.066 
(0.063) 
Education 
 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
 
0.068 
(0.060) 
Health 
 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.019* 
(0.011) 
0.067 
(0.052) 
C: Savings 
 
    
Monthly savings 
 
0.034** 
(0.010) 
0.040*** 
(0.012) 
0.050*** 
(0.019) 
 
0.220*** 
(0.071) 
Money for arisan 
 
-0.033** 
(0.020) 
-0.041** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.073** 
(0.034) 
-0.256** 
(0.112) 
 
D: Employment of 
respondent or spouse 
 
 
0.001 
(0.016) 
 
0.001 
(0.018) 
 
-0.034 
(0.025) 
 
-0.138 
(0.125) 
 
 
E: Contraceptive use by 
respondent or spouse 
 
0.012 
(0.007) 
 
0.014 
(0.008) 
 
0.015 
(0.011) 
 
0.059 
(0.050) 
 
Notes: The number in each cell in column 1 is the estimate of older cohorts in a regression of decision making 
authority on older cohorts and year of birth cubic polynomial. Each cell in column 2 is the corresponding 2SLS 
estimate. Columns 3 and 4 present the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates of the effect of educational 
attainment and completion of senior high school on decision making authority, respectively. Bootstrap standard 
errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The asteriks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, 
and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5: The effects on ownership of assets 
  The effects of 
 Reduced-form 
 
(1) 
Longer school 
year 
(2) 
Educational 
attainment  
 (3) 
Completing high 
school 
 (4) 
 
House and land  
 
 
0.016 
(0.009) 
 
 
0.018 
(0.011) 
 
0.014 
(0.013) 
 
0.057 
(0.067) 
Poultry 
 
0.027 
(0.039) 
 
0.031 
(0.044) 
0.148 
(0.294) 
-0.257 
(20.24) 
Livestock -0.048 
(0.068) 
-0.060 
(0.084) 
0.488 
(1.880) 
-0.511 
(0.697) 
     
Vehicles 
 
0.046* 
(0.034) 
0.054* 
(0.029) 
0.052 
(0.046) 
 
0.200 
(0.175) 
Household appliances 
 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
0.032** 
(0.013) 
0.045** 
(0.021) 
 
0.198** 
(0.089) 
Savings  -0.024 
(0.041) 
-0.033 
(0.041) 
0.022 
(0.063) 
 
0.053 
(0.183) 
Receivables  
 
-0.014 
(0.027) 
 
-0.014 
(0.055) 
0.004 
(0.030) 
0.016 
(0.205) 
Jewelry -0.026** 
(0.010) 
-0.014* 
(0.011) 
-0.021** 
(0.010) 
-0.093** 
(0.046) 
 
Notes: The number in each cell in column 1 is the estimate of older cohorts in a regression of ownership of assets 
on older cohorts and year of birth cubic polynomial. Each cell in column 2 is the corresponding 2SLS estimate. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates of the effects of educational attainment and 
completion of senior high school on ownership of assets, respectively. Bootstrap standard errors with 100 
replications are in parentheses. The asteriks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 6: The effect on community participation 
  The effects of 
 Reduced-form 
 
(1) 
Longer school 
year 
(2) 
Educational 
attainment 
(3) 
Completing high 
school 
(4) 
     
Monthly arisan 
 
0.033* 
(0.023) 
 
0.038* 
(0.019) 
0.042 
(0.026) 
0.213 
(0.134) 
Community meeting 
 
0.018 
(0.016) 
 
0.021 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.106) 
Village cooperative 
 
-0.035 
(0.028) 
 
-0.041 
(0.025) 
-0.040 
(0.022) 
-0.268 
(0.150) 
Programme to improve the 
village 
 
-0.004 
(0.019) 
 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
-0.026 
(0.021) 
-0.132 
(0.106) 
Voluntary labor 
 
0.003 
(0.029) 
 
0.004 
(0.025) 
-0.008 
(0.024) 
-0.041 
(0.125) 
Village savings and loans 
 
0.032 
(0.037) 
 
0.037 
(0.030) 
0.163 
(0.111) 
0.663* 
(0.381) 
Health fund 
 
0.061 
(0.053) 
 
0.083 
(0.074) 
0.078 
(0.169) 
0.270 
(0.387) 
Women’s association activities 
 
-0.002 
(0.023) 
 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
-0.001 
(0.027) 
-0.027 
(0.145) 
Community weighing post 0.050*** 
(0.023) 
 
0.058*** 
(0.020) 
0.111*** 
(0.036) 
0.539*** 
(0.170) 
Notes: The number in each cell in column 1 is the estimate of older cohorts in a regression of community 
participation on older cohorts and year of birth cubic polynomial. Each cell in column 2 is the corresponding 
2SLS estimate. Columns 3 and 4 present the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates of the effects of educational 
attainment and completion of senior high school on political or community participation, respectively. Bootstrap 
standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The asteriks ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7: Using additional control variables and alternative polynomial functions of the 
assignment variable 
 Effects of educational attainment Effects of completing senior high school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
      
 
 
Number of live 
births 
-0.400*** 
(0.0750) 
-0.268*** 
(0.101) 
-0.405** 
(0.103) 
-0.369*** 
(0.109) 
-2.313*** 
(0.414) 
 
-1.089** 
(0.469) 
-1.969** 
(0.493) 
-1.759*** 
(0.515) 
 
Received Tetanus  
Injection 
 
0.075*** 
(0.022) 
 
0.119*** 
(0.032) 
 
0.075** 
(0.027) 
 
0.079** 
(0.041) 
 
0.051** 
(0.129) 
 
0.624** 
(0.158) 
 
0.382** 
(0.141) 
 
0.392** 
(0.154) 
 
Currently using  
Contraception 
 
0.069*** 
(0.024) 
 
0.058** 
(0.029) 
 
0.069** 
(0.028) 
 
 
0.067** 
(0.032) 
 
0.512** 
(0.142) 
 
0.371** 
(0.153) 
 
0.434** 
(0.151) 
 
0.422** 
(0.163) 
Breastfeed child 0.031** 
(0.015) 
0.035*** 
(0.013) 
 
0.034** 
(0.013) 
0.039** 
(0.016) 
0.175* 
(0.093) 
0.166** 
(0.070) 
0.163** 
(0.071) 
0.181** 
(0.080) 
Decision making 
on monthly 
savings 
0.021 
(0.014) 
0.042** 
(0.020) 
0.051** 
(0.019) 
0.046** 
(0.020) 
0.099* 
(0.057) 
0.162** 
(0.069) 
0.222*** 
(0.072) 
0.213** 
(0.082) 
         
Household 
appliances 
 
0.027** 
(0.013) 
0.057** 
(0.024) 
0.046** 
(0.012) 
0.043** 
(0.020) 
0.143* 
(0.074) 
0.262** 
(0.109) 
0.201** 
(0.089) 
0.201** 
(0.092) 
Controls 
        
Year of birth     
quadratic 
polynomial 
 
   
 
   
 
Year of birth 
cubic polynomial 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Year of birth 
quartic 
polynomial 
  
 
    
 
  
 
Age cubic 
polynomial  
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Religion 
indicators  
    
 
    
 
Notes: The number in each cell is the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimate of the effect of educational attainment 
or completion of senior high school. Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The 
asteriks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 8: Using alternative assignment variables and definitions of the longer school year 
 Effects of educational attainment  Effects of completing senior high 
school 
 
 
 
Dependent variable 
Assignment 
variable: year 
of birth 
Longer school 
year: using year 
of entry 
(1) 
Assignment 
variable: year 
of entry 
Longer school 
year: using year 
of entry 
(2) 
Assignment 
variable: year 
of birth 
Longer school 
year: using year 
of entry 
(3) 
Assignment 
variable: year 
of entry 
Longer school 
year: using year 
of entry 
(4) 
     
Number of live births -0.390*** 
(0.098) 
 
-0.545*** 
(0.153) 
-1.934*** 
(0.479) 
-3.157*** 
(0.883) 
Received Tetanus  
Injection 
0.075** 
(0.027) 
 
0.085*** 
(0.028) 
0.383** 
(0.139) 
0.671** 
(0.243) 
Currently using  
Contraception 
 
0.058** 
(0.029) 
0.032 
(0.027) 
0.375** 
(0.152) 
0.238 
(0.245) 
Breastfeed child 0.034** 
(0.014) 
0.034 
(0.022) 
0.150** 
(0.075) 
0.299 
(0.216) 
     
Decision making on monthly savings 0.049* 
(0.019) 
0.051** 
(0.021) 
0.219*** 
(0.071) 
0.338** 
(0.138) 
     
Household appliances 
 
0.045** 
(0.021) 
 
0.035** 
(0.018) 
0.198** 
(0.089) 
0.212** 
(0.108) 
Notes: The number in each cell is the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimate of the effect of educational attainment 
(column 1 and 2) or completion of senior high school (columns 3 and 4). Each regression includes year of birth 
cubic polynomial. Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The asteriks ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 9: Falsification tests 
   
Dependent variable (1) (2) 
 
Age 
 
-0.081 
(0.020) 
 
 
-0.020 
(0.023) 
Born in rural area 0.083 
(0.043) 
 
0.096* 
(0.050) 
 
Lived in rural area when twelve years old 0.029 
(0.044) 
 
0.036 
(0.049) 
When twelve years old biological parents were married -0.045 
(0.025) 
 
-0.052* 
(0.028) 
Biological parents  live in household -0.029 
(0.018) 
-0.035 
(0.021) 
 
Variable used to define longer school year 
 
  
Year of birth   
 
Year of entry 
  
 
Notes: The number in each cell is the 2SLS estimate of the longer school year, which is defined using year of 
birth or year of entry. Each regression includes the year of birth cubic polynomial. Bootstrap standard errors with 
100 replications are in parentheses. The asterik * indicates statistical significance at 10% level. 
 
 
 
